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Short abstract:  
New research demonstrates systematic errors of tactile localisation, involving confusions of 
body parts and body sides. Such errors do not follow the organisation of topographic maps in 




The skin can convey many sensations, which are translated into our ability to perceive, for 
instance, the smooth texture of a marble statue or the pinprick of a mosquito bite. Common to 
all these sensations is the phenomenological experience that they occur somewhere on the 
body. Indeed, unlike other bodily sensations such hunger or fatigue, it is difficult to conceive 
of a tactile sensation which can be felt but not localized, whether in its current true spatial 
location or in an erroneous one [1]. Even in the extreme case of patients who are unable to 
locate tactile sensations correctly, touches are not perceived floating in the air, but as 
happening somewhere within the confines of their body [2,3]. Touches on the body, are 
initially represented in the cortex in an orderly manner, so that adjacent parts of the skin are 
represented by adjacent bits of the brain [4]. This has been famously illustrated in textbook 
depictions of Penfield’s sensory homunculus in the primary somatosensory cortex (S1; Figure 
1). Given this cortical topography, one might assume that the problem of localising a touch 
on the skin reduces to localising a corresponding peak of activation in these somatotopic 
maps. Indeed, several studies have shown that the brain can represent tactile location via 
population coding within somatotopic maps [5], and some reports of mislocalizations in 
amputees suggest a dependency on homuncular organization, as when touches on the 
ipsilateral face, which is adjacent to the arm in the homunculus, evoke tactile sensations on 
the phantom arm [6]. A new study by Badde et al. [7] in this issue of Current Biology, 
challenges this “homuncular” view and delivers important new insight into how our nervous 
system relies on abstract features or categorical information to locate touch. 
 Existing neurocognitive models of somatosensory processing have suggested that 
localizing a touch within a somatotopic map is not by itself sufficient to localize the stimulus 
on the body surface, but require higher order body representations (e.g., [8]). In the early 20th 
century, before the discovery of the topographical architecture of the somatosensory cortex 
[4], Head and Holmes [3], already proposed a mental representation of the body surface to 
account for the deficits of patients who could detect touch, but were unable to localize where 
on the body the touch was. This representation has come to be called the superficial schema. 
We do not have to go so far from our daily routines, however, to envision the need for such 
representation. Now spare a thought for the kid who is learning to play the guitar. With 
training, the cortical representation of the fingertips of her left hand which she uses for 
fingering the strings on the fretboard will enlarge as compared to other kids of her age (cf. 
[9]). But, how after such cortical changes is she still able to localize touch without producing 
massive mislocalizations? This is where a body representation, such as the superficial schema 
comes into play, as a link between cortical maps and body locations that is updated to reflect 
plastic changes to those maps, and that accounts for their inherent distortions and 
magnifications [8]. Nevertheless, such models have difficulty accounting for puzzling 
mislocalizations observed in some amputees, where tactile stimuli on a foot are occasionally 
attributed to the absent hand [6], since the hand and foot are far apart in the somatosensory 
homunculus (Figure 1).  
 More than a century after Head and Homes’ first insights into tactile localization, 
Badde et al.’s [7] research provides remarkable evidence for mislocalizations in healthy 
individuals that are, as in the example with the amputees, not determined either by the 
sensory homunculus or the superficial schema. They show that when touched on a limb, 
healthy adults occasionally – but systematically – misattribute the touch to a limb that was 
not touched at all. Many of these “phantom errors” were attributed to the homologous 
contralateral limb, e.g., the right hand for a touch on the left hand, a pattern that could 
possibly be explained by reliance on the somatosensory homunculus given growing evidence 
of the existence of bilateral receptive fields [10] and inter-hemispheric interactions [11], as 
early as in S1 (for a review see [12]). However, a smaller set of phantom errors were 
systematically attributed to opposite limb types, e.g., a foot for a hand and vice-versa, which 
excludes overlapping representations in S1 as a source of these phantom errors, since the 
hand and foot are far apart in S1. One possibility could be that these mislocalizations might 
arise from overlapping representations in S2 (secondary somatosensory cortex), where the 
foot and hand representations are adjacent, at least in monkeys [13]. However, an explanation 
based on adjacent representations in S2, could only partially account for the pattern of 
mislocalizations observed in Badde et al.’s study [7]: while it could explain why phantom 
errors are more frequent across feet and hands sharing the same body side, it cannot account 
for the fact that mislocalizations are more often than chance referred to the limb placed at the 
stimulated limb’s canonical side of space (e.g., which for the right hand would be the right 
side of space).  
 The mislocalizations reported here are therefore consistent with their resulting from 
representations in which touch is coded in terms of a number of abstract features, rather than 
as a spatial map. This way of representing touch may be related to some other results in the 
literature. For example, interleaving the fingers of a hand can lead to confusions about what 
hand is touched, but not which finger, despite the fact that finger type and laterality could 
both rely on the same activity in S1 [14]. Similarly, the pattern of mislocalizations at the 
hairy and glabrous skin are virtually identical, despite being clearly different at the level of 
S1, which suggest the use of a representation abstracting away from the details of each 
individual skin surface [15]. The pattern of mislocalizations reported by Badde et al. [7] 
provides new and exciting insight into the type of information that is needed to encode 
location, and appears to implicate the use of representations based on body-related 
categorical information. This idea fits with recent studies showing that motor representations 
of the body in the posterior parietal cortex show substantial degrees of mixed selectivity, with 
common responses to movements made with the hand and foot, or by the left and right hands 
(e.g., [16]). The present results suggest that similar mixed coding may also be employed in 
touch (Figure 1).  
 A representation based on high-dimensional mixed-selectivity would produce very 
different patterns of confusions and errors than one based on topographic maps. The phantom 
errors reported by Badde et al. [7] emphasise three relevant features, in decreasing order of 
importance: body part (i.e., a hand or a foot), body laterality (i.e., right or left), and canonical 
spatial location. These illusory percepts resemble those obtained in vision, the so-called 
illusory conjunctions, in which people report single objects having a combination of features 
which were not actually presented [17]. Indeed, Badde et al.’s [7] results can be thought of as 
a form of illusory conjunction on touch based on the features of limbs. Studies of illusory 
conjunctions in vision show that such conjunctions are modulated by stimulus similarity [17]. 
The present results suggest that a similar process might take place in touch, and demonstrate 
at least three relevant categorical features along which similarity is defined. For instance, 
phantom errors typically matched the correct limb with respect to limb type, and body side. 
Interestingly, a third feature is the body part’s canonical location. Several accounts have 
highlighted, based on indirect evidence, the role of the canonical location of the limb 
representation in tactile localization at initial stages of sensory processing. For instance, by 
assuming that immediately following stimulation, touch is referred to a stored representation 
of the default posture [8] (for a review see [12]). Badde et al. [7] results provides direct 
evidence of the existence of such canonical representations.   
 Perhaps, one of the most surprising points in Badde et al. [7], is the finding that the 
external location of the touched limb did not predict the pattern of mislocalizations across 
hand and foot. This contradicts the widespread idea that touch takes the posture of the 
touched limb into account even in situations where there is no overt reaction to touch (e.g., 
[18]). On the contrary, Badde et al. [7], propose that when explicit continuous localization is 
not needed, for instance to report or move the touched limb, tactile processing can abstract 
away from topographic representations (somatotopic or external), and use bodily related 
categories relevant to the task itself. This raises a potentially interesting analogy to studies in 
vision which have argued for two distinct systems for spatial representation, one based on 
precise spatial coordinates, the other based on categorical spatial relations [19]. A question 
that remains to be answered, however, is under which circumstances touch relies on 
categorical vs coordinate spatial relations. For example, the so-called ‘crossed-hands deficit’, 
in which the ability to tell which of the hands was touched first is impaired when the hands 
are crossed, has been widely-used as an experimental model of tactile localisation in external 
space [20]. The present results, however, raise the possibility that the deficit may not result 
from the precise coding of touch in continuous external space, but from an incorrect 
assignment of touch to a particular limb.   
 The results of Badde et al. raise fundamental questions about our experience of touch. 
The immediacy of tactile experience has sometimes led touch to be thought of as privileged 
among senses and even infallible, as in Bishop Berkeley’s famous claim that “touch tutors 
vision”. By documenting novels ways in which touch goes wrong, this paper shows that we 
may need to think twice when we feel an insect land on our arm, or we may swat the wrong 
limb entirely. Good news if you’re a mosquito. 
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Figure 1. Continuous vs categorical representations in tactile localization.  
The ability to locate where on the continuous body surface touch has occurred putatively 
depends on the topographic maps observed in the primary somatosensory cortex (marked in 
soft grey). This is illustrated in what is known as the sensory homunculus, as an orderly 
topography of body parts in the cortex. Alternatively, the ability to locate touch on the skin 
might be based on abstract features or categorical information related to the touched body 
part. This second view is supported by Badde et al.’s [7] pattern of mislocalisations between 
hands and feet, which are clearly not determined by proximity in the homunculus. These 
mislocalizations follow a systematic pattern consistent with the use of three main categorical 
features: 1) body part, by which a touch on the right hand might be misperceived to the left 
hand (i.e., the homologous limb); 2) body laterality, by which a touch on the right hand might 
be misperceived to the right foot; and 3) canonical side of the touched body, by which a 
touch on the crossed right hand might be misperceived to the foot placed at the right side, 
even though the touch was located at the left side of external space. Intriguingly, the external 
location of the touched limb did not predict the pattern of mislocalizations across hands and 
feet. The four types of categorical features are schematically represented on the right panel. 
We refer to posterior parietal brain regions (marked in dark grey) as the source for such 
putative representations, following evidence that these regions might represent categorical 
information, such as body parts and body sides in a partially mixed fashion [16].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
